Cryptography and Security

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Version 3

Lecture 13: Protocols for Security Services

Main Topics of this Lecture

1. Authentication protocols and their classification.
2. A protocol for authentication and nonrepudiation.
3. A protocol for authentication, confidentiality and nonrepudiation.
4. Merkel's protocol and a man-in-the-middle attack.
5. The Needham-Schröder protocol.

Part I: Authentication Protocols and their Classification

Authentication Aspects

- Verify that the received message has not been altered (i.e., data authentication).
- Verify that the alleged sender is the real one (sender authentication).
- Verify the timeliness of messages.

A Basic Model of Authentication

A wants to send messages to B. They share a secret function f. A sends

$$m||f(m).$$

When B receives the message c, he partitions c into $c = c_1||c_2$ and check whether $f(c_1) = c_2$. If yes, he concludes that c is indeed the message from A and it was not modified during transmission.

The part $f(m)$ is called the **authenticator**, while f is referred to as the **authentication function**. Usually the length of $f(m)$ is fixed.

Natural Law: If you want to gain, you have to pay.

Question: What is the price paid in this system?

Remark: It uses a preshared secret, where the two parties trust each other.

Authentication Functions

Question: How to design the authentication function f in the basic model?

Design consideration: The receiver should be able to partition the received message for authentication checking.

Approach 1: The length of the authenticator $f(m)$ varies with that of m.

For example, the encryption transformation of a one-key cipher.

Approach 2: The length of the authenticator $f(m)$ is the same for all m.

For example, a keyed hash function h_k.

Authentication Protocol 1

The protocol: Suppose that Alice and Bob share a secret key k for a one-key cipher and no third party possesses k. Assume that the cipher text $E_k(m)$ has always the same length as that of the message m.

$$\text{Alice} \quad \longrightarrow \quad m||E_k(m) \quad \longrightarrow \quad \text{Bob}$$

Authentication checking proceedure: Left to the reader.

Authentication level: Depends on the security of the one-key cipher. If a secret key is used only once, it offers perfect authentication.

Advantages and disadvantages: High-level authentication, but very expensive.

Authentication Protocol 2

Protocol: Let h be a hash function. Assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key k of a one-key cipher. No third party possesses k.

$$\text{Alice} \quad \longrightarrow \quad m||E_k[h(m)] \quad \longrightarrow \quad \text{Bob}$$

When receiving the data c, Bob partitions c into $c_1||c_2$, where c_2 has the same length as $E_k[h(m)]$. Bob then compares $h(c_1)$ with $D_k(c_2)$.

Conclusion: It provides a certain degree of authentication of both sender and message, but no confidentiality for message. Why?

Remark: The function $E_k \circ h$ is in fact a keyed hash function.

Security of Authentication Protocol 2

The first attack on the protocol: Observing $m||E_k[h(m)]$, an enemy E then randomly picks up an m', then replaces $m||E_k[h(m)]$ with a forged message $m'||E_k[h(m)]$ and sends it to Bob. E wishes that Bob accept it as the message from Alice.

Success probability: $\Pr(h(m) = h(m'))$.

Security requirements: The size of the hash value should be long enough. The hash values should be more or less "uniformly distributed".

Security of Authentication Protocol 2 – Continued

The second attack on the protocol: Observing $m||E_k[h(m)]$, an enemy E then tries to find an m' such that $h(m) = h(m')$. E then replaces $m||E_k[h(m)]$ with a forged message $m'||E_k[h(m)]$ and sends it to Bob.

Security requirement: For a given m, it should be computationally infeasible to find an m' such that

$$h(m) = h(m').$$

A Classification of Authentication Protocols

Type 1: Those based on a preshared secret. For example, Authentication Protocol 1 and Authentication Protocol 2 in this lecture.

Type 2: Those do not need a preshared secret. For example, the following is for mutual authentication:

1. A sends $E_{k_e^{(B)}}[N_1||ID_A]$ to B, where N_1 is a nonce used to identify this transaction uniquely, and is generated by A.
2. B generates a new nonce N_2, and sends $E_{k_e^{(A)}}[N_1||N_2||ID_B]$ to A. After decryption A gets N_1, and is sure that the responder is B.
3. A sends $E_{k_e^{(B)}}[N_2||ID_A]$ to B.

Part II: A Protocol for Authentication and Nonrepudiation

Authentication with Nonrepudiation

Protocol: Let h be a hash function. Assume that Alice and Bob have exchanged their public keys.

$$\text{Alice} \quad \longrightarrow \quad m||D_{k_d^{(A)}}[h(m)] \quad \longrightarrow \quad \text{Bob}$$

When receiving the data c, Bob partitions c into $c_1||c_2$, where c_2 has the same length as $D_{k_d^{(A)}}[h(m)]$. Bob then compares $h(c_1)$ with $E_{k_e^{(A)}}(c_2)$.

Conclusion: It provides a certain degree of authentication & nonrepudiation, but no confidentiality. Why?

Security requirements: The same as those in Authentication Protocol 2.

Part III: A Protocol for Authentication, Confidentiality and Nonrepudiation

Authentication + Nonrepudiation + Confidentiality

Protocol: Let h be a hash function. Assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key k of a one-key cipher, and have exchanged their public keys.

$$\text{Alice} \quad \longrightarrow \quad E_k\left(m||D_{k_d^{(A)}}[h(m)]\right) \quad \longrightarrow \quad \text{Bob}$$

Bob verifies the sender, message, and signature similarly.

Exercise: Give details of the verification process.

Conclusion: It provides a certain degree of authentication, nonrepudiation, and confidentiality.

Why?

Part IV: Key Distribution Protocols and Man-in-the-middle Attacks

Secret Key Distribution with a PKC

Comments:

Public key cryptosystems are usually not used for real encryption, as they are very slow. They are used for distributing secret keys of one-key ciphers and/or for signing messages.

Question: How to use a PKC for distributing a secret key?

Merkel's Key Distribution Protocol

Scenario: A and B want to establish a session key.

1. A generates a key pair $\left(k_e^{(A)}, k_d^{(A)}\right)$, and sends $k_e^{(A)}||ID_A$ to B, where ID_A is an identifier of A.
2. B generates a secret key k, and sends $E_{k_e^{(A)}}(k)$ to A.
3. A computes $D_{k_d^{(A)}}\left[E_{k_e^{(A)}}(k)\right] = k$.
4. A discards $\left(k_e^{(A)}, k_d^{(A)}\right)$, and B discards $k_e^{(A)}$.

Merkel Key Distribution Protocol: Pictorial



Comments: This protocol is vulnerable to an active attack. If an enemy E has control of the **intervening** communication channel, then E can **"compromise"** the communication without being detected.

Question: What is the **active** attack?

Active Attack on the Merkel Protocol

1. A generates a key pair $\left(k_e^{(A)}, k_d^{(A)}\right)$, and sends $k_e^{(A)}||ID_A$ intended for B, where ID_A is an identifier of A.
2. E intercepts the message, creates its own key pair $\left(k_e^{(E)}, k_d^{(E)}\right)$, and sends $k_e^{(E)}||ID_A$ to B.
3. B generates a secret key k, and sends $E_{k_e^{(E)}}(k)$ (intended for A).
4. E intercepts the message, decrypts it to get k; then he computes and sends $E_{k_e^{(A)}}(k)$ to A.

Comment: A and B are unaware that E has got k.

The Intruder-in-the-Middle Attack: Pictorial



attacker in the middle

Active attack on the Merkel Protocol

The Modified Needham-Schröder Protocol

For both confidentiality and authentication:

Assume that A and B have exchanged their public keys with some method.



Remarks: Nonce N_1 is to identify this transaction uniquely.

The Modified Needham-Schröder Protocol

1. A sends $E_{k_e^{(B)}}[N_1||ID_A]$ to B, where N_1 is a nonce used to identify this transaction uniquely, and is generated by A.
2. B generates a new nonce N_2, and sends $E_{k_e^{(A)}}[N_1||N_2]$ to A. After decryption A gets N_1, and is sure that the responder is B.
3. A selects a secret key k and sends $E_{k_e^{(B)}}[N_2||k]$ to B.
   (Encryption with B's public key ensures confidentiality)
4. After decryption B gets N_2 and k, and is sure that its correspondent is A.

Question: How does this protocol ensure both confidentiality and authenticity? Is it really secure with respect to passive and active attacks?